The case for
There can be few countries in which the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for Health nd themselves publicly involved in accounting for the care provided for a particular patient. Yet this is what we witnessed in the UK in 2002 as Tony Blair and Alan Milburn felt it necessary to engage in detailed explanations of the care one particular elderly woman, Rose Addis, received at the Whittington Hospital in London. We do not expect an Education Secretary to explain why a particular pupil obtained poor exam grades, so why should we expect the equivalent of a Health Secretary?
Clearly both health care and education are highly political areas of public policy. And some decisions, such as how much to spend on services and how to distribute resources geographically, are legitimately the responsibility of national politicians in a tax-funded system. But it does not follow that central government should be involved in deciding which people to treat, when to treat them and how best to organise care. Attempts to do so result in the plethora of guidance that emanates daily from the UK health departments. The dif culties of managing a hospital or primary care organisation are challenging enough without having to contend with satisfying the needs of politicians. This problem is exacerbated by the short electoral time-scale that dominates politicians' agendas. Good decisions about health services need to adopt much longer time frames.
There is a second reason to challenge the status quo. The current system, in which managers of health services are constantly concerned with meeting centrally imposed short-term demands, tends to sti e and discourage innovation and reform processes that need to be given time. For example, being required to meet short-term targets, such as waiting times for elective surgery, may focus managers and clinicians on 'quick
x', non-sustainable solutions such as funding additional theatre sessions at weekends. Sustainable changes, such as redesigning surgical work with a greater role for specialised nurses, have to be put off as they will only realise bene ts after several years, too slowly for the electoral cycle. There are few, if any, inducements for managers and clinicians to be enterprising. This is a serious impediment to the modernisation of the service, changes that are essential if it is to meet the needs of the public and retain support from across the political spectrum. An agency, at arm's length from government, with a long-term view would be in an easier position to protect health care providers committed to the fundamental redesigns that are needed than government ministers who, with one eye constantly on the next election, feel the need to deliver apparent improvements immediately.
Whenever the direct involvement of politicians in the running of the National Health Service (NHS) is questioned, we are told that a tax-funded system requires democratic accountability through P arliament. Fine, but that does not mean that politicians need be involved in managing the system. There seems to be a failure to distinguish two essential but distinct activitiesleadership and management. P oliticians should provide leadership -vision and values concerning the equity and the humanity of services. It should then be left to managers to sort out how to achieve their political masters' vision. What is needed is a clear separation of these two tasks. This would free politicians from their sense of responsibility for every bedpan that is dropped in the NHS. The latter is a management responsibility that should be shifted to an arm's length agency.
Such a body would remain accountable to P arliament and would be responsible for ensuring government policies were delivered by the NHS. To increase the accountability of the NHS to the public, in parallel, the governance of primary care organisations could be modi ed to include local representation (either elected or selected), and acute hospital trusts could be given greater independence from central government by transforming them into some form of mutual (such as a public interest company), again with local people included in their governance (as envisaged in the recent legislation to create 'foundation trusts'). This would encourage local commitment and a sense of 'ownership', so badly lacking in the current control and command approach. This is not such a radical idea. The rst act that Gordon Brown undertook as Chancellor in 1997 was to shift responsibility for monetary policy to an independent committee. Despite this, he remains accountable to Parliament for economic policy and performance. Similar developments have been enacted with the establishment of the Housing Corporation and Environment Agency. Universities have been accountable to the Higher Education Funding Council (and their predecessors) for several decades and they, in turn, are accountable to ministers.
There is no universally correct form of governance and every approach has its advantages and disadvantages. Like any policy proposal, an arm's length agency is not without its dangers. Choice of policy should be governed by weighing up the potential advantages and disadvantages of each option. This involves deciding not J Health Serv Res Policy Vol 9 No 1 January 2004 1 so much what the advantages are that we want, but more on which are the least worst disadvantages, the ones that we can tolerate, despite them being unwelcome. In the case of devolved responsibility, two major risks are often cited. First, geographical equity would be threatened as a result of local diversity in service provision. However, such variation already exists and it is unclear whether this would be any greater with an arm's length agency. Such an agency would continue to set the broad requirements for local provision and a central regulator, the Commission for Healthcare Audit and Inspection, would ensure minimum acceptable standards. Second, local providers might have an undue and inappropriate in uence on local priorities once released from the current central controls. Provider managers may struggle to resist the demands of the more powerful professions. Again, this is a danger that already exists. The answer lies in strengthening management both in providers and in local purchasers, the primary care organisations, a challenge that the current English system must confront.
It is time for the health sector to catch up with modern governance practices and establish an independent agency to manage the NHS. The greatest advantage would be that it would free government ministers and P arliament to provide leadership in health policy rather than just NHS policy or, worse still, policy on how best to look after Rose Addis.
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The case against
The debate about whether the NHS in England should be run through an arm's length agency rather than directly from central government is a debate about how the NHS should be made accountable to the government and to Parliament, and, particularly, the relative power of those in the Service, as opposed to ministers, to determine how the NHS behaves. Those in favour of an arm's length agency believe that the NHS could be more intelligently, exibly and creatively managed if ministers and their civil servants had less detailed involvement in directing the Service. The current resurgence of interest in the idea of a new headquarters agency for the NHS 1 appears to be a reaction to the second Blair government's increasingly insistent pressure for the NHS to 'deliver' against targets and priorities that ministers believe re ect the genuine concerns of patients and the public. Critics of the targets and the status quo beg to differ. They are also concerned that the current system sti es innovation and fosters short-termism. It is further argued that there is something inherently old-fashioned about the current, seemingly highly centralised arrangements for managing the NHS.
Yet, all participants in this debate are agreed that the NHS must, in some way, be accountable to Parliament and thence to taxpayers and the public for its use of billions of pounds of public nance. No one would expect the NHS to be nanced by taxpayers, but with no expectations of accountability in return. Likewise, no one would argue that ministers should be required to explain the care given to individual patients. The question is how to design a system of accountability in which actors at each level from the patient to Parliament are more likely to account for the things that are appropriately their responsibility than they do at present.
There is nothing wrong in principle with running the NHS at arm's length through some sort of quango or public corporation outside the Department of Health. For example, such a national body would be as well, if not better, placed than, the Department of Health to allocate resources fairly between areas. The key questions are whether or not the role of such an agency would be sustainable for more than a short time and whether or not it would make an appreciable difference to the quality and ef ciency of the Service to justify the cost, short-term upheaval and added complexity of the chain of accountability that it would bring. This is particularly pertinent when the government is already pursuing a devolution strategy at the provider level through legislation to establish NHS hospitals, and, in time, other providers, as autonomous 'foundation trusts' over which the Secretary of State will have no direct control. 'Foundation trusts' already go some way towards breaking the political accountability for individual patient care.
Once ministers had ridden out the storm of criticism that they were 'shirking' their responsibilities by setting up a stand-alone agency to run the NHS, there would be continuing debates and inevitable uncertainty about the appropriate boundary between the role of ministers and the role of the new NHS agency. The agency and/or NHS staff would almost certainly complain that ministers were over-zealous in the detail of their demands. Ministers would continue to be put under intense pressure from opposition parties and the media to be seen to be 'doing something' about the problems of the hour in the Service as long as the NHS remains publicly funded and largely provided through publicly owned organisations. For example, at present, patients who have failed to receive a satisfactory response to their complaints within the local NHS, often seek the help of their Members of P arliament to take up their cases with the Secretary of State. Is it realistic to imagine that Members will be content in dealing with the NHS agency instead?
Experience shows that a clear distinction between 'leadership' and 'management' resides largely in the eye of the beholder and would be constantly challenged. This is at least partly because governments care not only about what is done in their name, but also how. Both aspects are an integral part of public policy and the underlying political ideologies that motivate governments and their opposition critics.
Editorial
Should the English NHS be freed from political control?
In addition, the periodic, formal negotiations between the government and the agency over the objectives and targets of the NHS would have to be detailed and protracted. The agency would nd itself increasingly informed by producer interests day-to-day and yet ministers would continue to wish to promote the interests of patients, taxpayers and the public. The agency would be caught in the middle. The current periodic con icts of view would be institutionalised and focused on formal negotiations rather than debated and resolved between ministers, civil servants, clinician groups and managers. The current lengthy chain of accountability from the delivery of care to the Parliamentary Public Accounts and Health Committees would be lengthened and made more complex. Information ows would become stickier as information had to pass through more separate organisations. The addition to the proposal for an NHS agency of local democratic control of provider organisations, as is planned for NHS 'foundation' hospitals in England, would complicate accountability still further.
Analogies with bodies such as universities, the Prison Service, the Passport Agency and the Monetary Policy Committee of the Bank of England, are misleading. Indeed, the current government stands accused of not giving the Prison Service suf cient autonomy despite its status as an arm's length agency. The Higher Education Funding Council is just that, a funder. It does not manage the universities.
Aside from the fact that few, if any, of the current agencies and quasi-independent public bodies have anything like the range of objectives to pursue that the new NHS agency would take on, there is the fact that the NHS is already organised as a series of arm's length agencies and has always been so. Primary care trusts and other NHS trusts are already constitutionally the health equivalents of the Passport Agency and the Prison Service. They are authorities in their own right, not simply bureaux of the Department of Health. They directly and indirectly determine the day-to-day pattern of delivery of services to patients, not the Department of Health or the Secretary of State. It is a great historical myth that the NHS is and has ever been 'run from Whitehall'. Whitehall has never decided which patients should be treated and how, although it may from time to time nd itself forced to explain and respond to failures of the system when they affect named individuals. The Service has always been run through a large number of regional and local agencies. Since this is so, it is hard to envisage how the addition of another organisation at national level in England would in itself improve the quality and ef ciency of the services delivered. Now that the NHS in Wales and Scotland is no longer the responsibility of the UK Parliament, the Welsh Assembly and Scottish Parliament would make their own decisions about whether or not to establish separate agencies for the NHS in their countries. It seems unlikely that Scotland, at least, would follow England's lead, thereby introducing another difference between the ways in which the English and Scottish versions of the NHS pursue their very similar goals.
The history of the NHS Executive, which was set up to manage the NHS outside the Department of Health in the 1980s and 1990s, is instructive. Gradually, it was reabsorbed into the Department since the distinction between strategy and operations constantly broke down. Arguably, this re-absorption was also pursued for the good reason that it introduced more NHS management expertise into the Department that had, hitherto, been the preserve of career civil servants.
Perhaps the clinching objection to the proposal for an NHS agency is that it represents yet another structural solution to the longstanding problem in the Service of reconciling local and national priorities and imperatives. The evidence is mounting that reforms of this sort rarely if ever produce the expected bene ts. Devolution can be pursued without setting up a new agency. It is a matter of the centre determining what it will and will not seek to control and direct. A less disruptive alternative would be simply to pass legislation restricting the scope of business that the Secretary of State could legitimately be expected to be responsible for to P arliament (e.g. not having to answer Opposition questions on the quality of care received by individual patients) and removing the minister's unfettered right to interfere in speci c matters judged more properly the domain of subordinate, NHS agencies. Similar provisions, appear in the legislation on'foundation' hospitals in the English NHS. Although this approach seems to be too modest for the advocates of high pro le change, it could be a better way forward than setting up yet another national agency.
